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This study examines whether board interlock ties facili- 
tate second-order imitation, in which firms imitate an 
underlying decision process that can be adapted to multi- 
ple policy domains, rather than imitating specific policies 
of tied-to firms (first-order imitation). Longitudinal analy- 
ses of archival data for a large sample of Forbes/Fortune 
500 companies, as well as analyses of survey data on 
mimetic processes among these firms, show that network 
ties to firms that use imitation to determine a particular 
policy can prompt use of imitation by the focal firm in 
determining both that policy and a different policy. Firms 
that have board network ties to firms in other industries 
that imitate their competitors' business strategy are likely 
to imitate their own competitors' business strategy, as 
well as their competitors' acquisition activity and com- 
pensation policy. Thus, the findings reveal network 
effects that are not visible with extant perspectives on 
interorganizational imitation. We discuss implications for 
institutional theory and research on interorganizational 
networks.- 
A long tradition of research in organization theory has exam- 
ined the diffusion of technology, policy, and strategy through 
social networks (Burt, 1987; Mizruchi, 1996). One of the 
most important propositions in this literature is that, under 
conditions of uncertainty, social influence processes will lead 
firms to imitate the individual policy decisions of other firms 
to which they are connected by social network ties (DiMag- 
gio and Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985). Empirical studies 
in the board interlocks literature, in particular, have examined 
how overlapping board memberships between firms may 
facilitate the imitation of particular organizational structures, 
such as the multidivisional form, or individual policy deci- 
sions, such as the adoption of poison pills (e.g., Davis, 1991; 
Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; Haunschild, 1993; West- 
phal and Zajac, 1997). Prior research may have underestimat- 
ed the magnitude of network effects, however, by restricting 
its focus to first-order imitation, or the act of imitating the 
content of a particular policy decision, such as the level of 
spending on research and development (R&D). Second-order 
imitation, or the imitation of an underlying decision process 
or script that can be adapted to multiple policy domains (e.g., 
business strategy, compensation policy, acquisition activity, 
etc.), has been ignored in the interlocks literature, despite a 
body of literature on second-order effects. 
In general, second-order phenomena are characterized by an 
underlying process mechanism that can explain multiple dis- 
crete first-order effects (e.g., Bartunek and Moch, 1987; 
Farmer et al., 1997). In the organizational behavior literature, 
for instance, researchers have invoked the notion of second- 
order change to describe cases in which a firm or unit adopts 
a decision-making routine such as participative management 
that leads to organizational changes in multiple policy 
domains (e.g., information systems, customer service, report- 
ing practices, etc.): the underlying process represents a 
second-order factor that can explain multiple discrete first- 
order changes in policy content (Manz and Sims, 1987; 
Cohen, Chang, and Ledford, 1997; Farmer et al., 1997). 
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Although prior research has found some evidence for the net- 
work diffusion of structures and policies that are widely 
applicable in varying industry environments, such as takeover 
defenses and the multidivisional form of organization, several 
researchers have noted that there is less evidence for the dif- 
fusion of strategic policy decisions (e.g., the level of spending 
on R&D or advertising) through board network ties (Davis, 
1994; Fligstein, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1997; Palmer and 
Barber, 2001). Most board ties, including ties examined in 
this study, link firms in different industries (Zajac, 1988), 
which in turn present different strategic threats and opportu- 
nities; thus, the extent of first-order imitation of strategic poli- 
cy decisions (i.e., in which firms imitate the specific content 
of strategic decisions made by their interlock partners) may 
be limited. But decision-making processes may spread 
through network ties that bridge industries. For instance, the 
propensity for a firm to formulate strategic policies by imitat- 
ing its competitors is a more generalizable component of the 
decision-making process that can be applied in many differ- 
ent industries, such that interlock ties may spread underlying 
mimetic processes, without necessarily diffusing the content 
of individual policy decisions. Thus, for instance, a pharma- 
ceuticals firm may not imitate the level of R&D at a tied-to 
firm in a less technology-driven industry, such as cosmetics. 
Yet the tendency for the tied-to cosmetics firm to determine 
its expenditures by imitating its competitors may influence 
the propensity for the pharmaceuticals firm to imitate the 
R&D spending of its pharmaceutical competitors. In this way, 
network ties may facilitate second-order imitation in which a 
focal firm imitates the mimetic decision process of a tied-to 
firm, without imitating the policy content of that firm. 
Second-order imitation is related to, but distinct from, sec- 
ond-order learning or double-loop learning. Argyris and Schbn 
(1978: 2-3) described second-order learning as "modification 
of an organization's underlying norms or objectives," which 
then leads to a variety of (first-order) policy changes in the 
organization. Similarly, second-order imitation involves 
changes in an underlying decision-making process that can 
lead to multiple changes in individual policy domains. More- 
over, Tushman and Romanelli (1985; Virany, Tushman, and 
Romanelli, 1992: 73) described second-order learning as fun- 
damental organizational change that creates a "new relation- 
ship of the firm to its environment." Similarly, second-order 
imitation results in fundamental change in a firm's relation- 
ship to its environment by increasing similarity between a 
focal firm and its competitors across different policy 
domains. The difference between the two is that while sec- 
ond-order imitation involves change in underlying mimetic 
processes that result from network ties to firms that have 
made similar changes in their decision processes, second- 
order learning is typically conceived strictly as change in 
underlying processes; that is, the source of the change is not 
addressed or is assumed to result from factors internal to the 
organization (Weick, 1979; Miner and Mezias, 1996). In 
effect, therefore, second-order imitation can be viewed as a 
particular type of second-order learning. 
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Second-order Imitation 
Institutional and social learning theorists have made consider- 
able progress in advancing our understanding of imitation 
(Ingram and Clay, 2000), but they have not considered all 
possible dimensions to firm mimicry. In particular, while the 
distinction between strategy process and content is funda- 
mental to the strategy and policy literature (Miles et al., 1978; 
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992), institutional theorists have 
focused their attention strictly on the imitation of policy con- 
tent, without considering that underlying decision-making 
processes might also be subject to imitation. The concept of 
second-order imitation contributes to the institutional itera- 
ture not only by introducing the potential for process vs. con- 
tent imitation but also by suggesting how the social learning 
that underlies imitation, particularly the imitation that occurs 
through interfirm network ties, may actually be more pro- 
nounced for decision processes than for policy content. 
Examining the diffusion of decision-making rules or process- 
es may uncover network effects that are effectively masked 
by an exclusive focus on policy content. 
SECOND-ORDER IMITATION THROUGH BOARD 
NETWORK TIES 
Neo-institutional theorists have suggested that uncertainty 
about the consequences of adopting a new structure or poli- 
cy will encourage imitation, and network ties such as board 
interlocks can channel mimetic processes by determining 
who firms imitate (March and Olsen, 1976; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; Burns and 
Wholey, 1993; Chaves, 1996). In effect, social network ties, 
and board appointments in particular, enable managers to 
learn about normative behavior (Galaskiewicz, 1997; West- 
phal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997). From this perspective, inter- 
lock ties can encourage imitation not only through conscious 
choice but also through less explicit socialization processes 
(Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989). Boards may provide 
the locus for social construction processes whereby partici- 
pating directors persuade each other that certain structures 
and policies have merit, even if evidence for their efficiency 
is lacking. This social influence process then leads to more 
widespread diffusion. This view is consistent with social 
modeling theory, which would suggest that directors may 
develop beliefs about appropriate courses of action by 
observing firsthand the decision making of their peers at 
other firms (Bandura, 1977; Haunschild, 1993; Kraatz, 1998). 
Institutional theorists view social modeling as a primary 
mechanism underlying mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983: 151). 
Research on interlocking directorates has focused on how 
these social processes facilitate the diffusion of individual 
corporate policies and structures, such as poison pills, dona- 
tions to nonprofit organizations, and multidivisional organiza- 
tional structures (e.g., Galaskiewicz and Wasserman, 1989; 
Davis, 1991; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). But a differ- 
ent kind of mimetic process may operate through board net- 
work ties to influence strategic change. In contrast to organi- 
zational structures such as the multidivisional form or 
corporate policies such as donations to charity, which may be 
similarly applicable in different industry environments, strate- 
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gic policies, by definition, are means of adapting to threats 
and opportunities in a firm's environment (Rumelt, Schendel, 
and Teece, 1991; Zajac, 1992). Moreover, top managers gen- 
erally assume that strategic policies (e.g., advertising and 
R&D, acquisition activity, and executive compensation policy) 
should help the firm adapt to threats and opportunities in its 
particular industry environment (Grinyer and Spender, 1979; 
Hambrick, 1981; Kopp, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992). Thus, 
given that most board network ties cross industry boundaries 
(Zajac, 1988), the content of strategic decisions may be less 
likely to spread through board interlock ties. Board network 
ties may have a stronger influence on imitation of decision- 
making processes that determine how firms adapt to their 
particular environment. 
From a neo-institutional perspective, which highlights the role 
of cognitive processes in organizational action, mimetic iso- 
morphism occurs to the extent that organizational phenome- 
na have become taken for granted as normatively appropriate 
(Scott, 1992, 1995). While individual policies can acquire nor- 
mative status as more firms adopt them over time (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1983; Fligstein, 1991; Edelman, 1992; Haveman, 
1993), organizational rules or scripts of behavior are particu- 
larly likely to become taken for granted through experience 
and/or social interaction (Scott, 1995). Meyer, Scott, and 
Strang (1987: 13) characterized organizational action as "the 
enactment of institutional scripts," and Scott (1995: 44) sug- 
gested that mimetic processes are driven by taken-for-grant- 
ed decision-making rules, or preconscious "guidelines for 
choosing meaningful actions." According to Scott (1995: 45), 
such rules may be derived from the larger social structure, 
which can operate as a repository or "carrier" of normative 
behavior. From this perspective, decision-making scripts 
emerge (i.e., they are socially constructed) and become taken 
for granted through the social interaction fostered by network 
ties (Scott, 1995). Thus, from a cognitive, institutional per- 
spective, when managers observe and/or participate in deci- 
sion-making processes as directors at other firms, they may 
reflexively enact those processes at the focal firm. In effect, 
decision-making rules or processes may acquire taken-for- 
granted status more readily than particular policy contents, 
such that board network ties may be particularly likely to 
facilitate their spread through mimetic isomorphism. More- 
over, while the imitation of particular policies may be con- 
strained by the industry environment, decision-making rules 
or processes can generalize more readily across industry 
boundaries. 
Research on social learning has also shown that individuals 
who observe or participate in decision-making activities tend 
to learn the behavioral processes or procedures that lead to a 
decision outcome more deeply than they learn the decision 
outcome itself (Bandura, 1986; Chickering and Gamson, 
1987; Stanton, 1989; McKeachie, 1994). The specific behav- 
iors and actions that lead to a decision are more vivid and 
immediate than the eventual outcome and, consequently, 
decision routines are encoded more deeply in memory and 
are more likely to be recalled and enacted later. Such process 
learning can occur vicariously through social modeling or 
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Second-order Imitation 
directly through participation. In learning vicariously, people 
may encode and remember scripts of behavior that lead to 
an outcome, rather than focusing on the outcome itself 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977; Gioia and Manz, 1985; 
McKeachie, 1994), particularly when they participate in the 
decision-making process (Chickering and Gamson, 1987; 
Wood and Bandura, 1989). Social learning is more likely to 
occur when individuals have the opportunity to rehearse the 
routine in question, and active participation allows an individ- 
ual to observe and then rehearse specific behaviors in the 
decision-making process (Bandura, 1977). In such cases, the 
routines that make up a decision-making process are more 
likely to be recalled and enacted in other, similar situations. 
While directors can learn decision-making scripts vicariously 
through monitoring management decision making, they can 
also learn directly through participation. Research on corpo- 
rate boards has shown that directors are increasingly 
involved in the process of formulating strategic decisions 
(Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; 
Useem, 1993; Westphal and Zajac, 1997). Given that direct 
participation in decision making is particularly likely to encour- 
age social learning, managers' appointments to other boards 
may be particularly likely to influence their approach to deci- 
sion making at a focal firm. Moreover, in contrast to network 
ties that rely on verbal or second-hand communication, net- 
work ties such as board ties that involve direct participation 
and observation may transfer even relatively tacit decision- 
making processes. 
The spread of mimetic decision processes may occur 
through the board ties of outside, or non-employee directors, 
as well as the ties of inside directors. In studies of network 
diffusion, some researchers have focused on the board ties 
of inside directors, under the assumption that outside direc- 
tors have little influence and involvement in the decision- 
making process, in which case their experience on other 
boards would have little effect on policies of the focal firm 
(Haunschild, 1993; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). Recent 
empirical evidence suggests, however, that outside directors 
have become significantly involved in strategic decision mak- 
ing at large U.S. companies (Useem, 1993; Westphal and 
Zajac, 1997; Westphal, 1999). Thus, the experience of both 
outside and inside directors with imitation at other firms 
could influence mimetic decision processes at the focal firm. 
Research on social learning indicates that specific actions in 
the decision-making process are often learned and enacted 
subconsciously (Bandura, 1986). In effect, consistent with 
the institutional perspective discussed above, behavioral 
scripts become taken for granted more readily than decision 
outcomes and are thus enacted in other situations more rou- 
tinely. The related literature on group norms has shown that 
people routinely use their past experiences in similar social 
settings as scripts for determining appropriate behavior in the 
current situation (Bettenhausen and Murnighan, 1985). This 
carry-over effect has a particularly strong influence on group 
decision-making processes, as group members bring taken- 
for-granted scripts from their prior experiences about the 
appropriate sequence of actions to arrive at a decision (Feld- 
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man, 1984). This research suggests that directors may enact 
decision-making scripts internalized from their participation 
on other boards without necessarily reflecting on whether 
the specific routines that make up the script are optimally 
suited to the current situation. This supports the institutional 
perspective that "action is the enactment of institutional 
scripts rather than a matter of internally generated and 
autonomous choice, motivation, and purpose" (Meyer, Scott, 
and Strang, 1987: 13). Conversely, directors may weigh the 
suitability of different strategic policies or goals (vs. process- 
es) more consciously (i.e., such analysis may be a compo- 
nent of the taken-for-granted ecision-making routines they 
enact). Thus, decision-making processes may be more likely 
to diffuse through board interlocks than the content of partic- 
ular decision outcomes. 
Decision-making processes are often defined as the "mecha- 
nism by which [policies] are determined" (Chandler, 1962; 
Segev, 1987: 259). In this study, we examine intraindustry 
imitation (i.e., the imitation of competitors) as one possible 
component of the process by which policy decisions are 
made. We examine such imitation with respect to three dif- 
ferent policy outcomes: business strategy, acquisition activi- 
ty, and executive compensation. Beyond selecting the chief 
executive officer (CEO), the primary responsibilities of boards 
are to oversee strategy and compensate top executives 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zajac, 1990). Although boards may 
become involved in decision making on a variety of issues, 
the research literature on corporate boards suggests that 
board involvement in policy-making is largely confined to 
three arenas: (1) overseeing business strategy, which 
involves the allocation of resources to key functional activi- 
ties in the firm, including production, marketing, research and 
development, and finance; (2) overseeing acquisition activity, 
as a primary aspect of corporate strategy (Demb and 
Neubauer, 1992; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Phan, 2000; 
Palmer and Barber, 2001), and (3) compensating top execu- 
tives (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; 
Phan, 2000). Thus, the decision-making processes that deter- 
mine these policies, including mimetic processes, should be 
particularly susceptible to diffusion through board network 
ties. 
Business strategy. Research in the strategy literature has 
shown that firms vary in the extent to which they consider 
the strategies of industry competitors, formally or informally, 
in determining their own strategic posture (Ghoshal and 
Westney, 1991; Porter, 1998). A mimetic decision process in 
this context may involve collecting data from archival sources 
such as COMPUSTAT on the level of resources allocated by 
competitors to key functional activities of the firm (e.g., pro- 
duction, marketing, R&D, etc.), comparing those spending 
levels with resource allocation at the focal firm, and then 
planning changes in spending to ensure that practices are in 
line with other firms in the industry (Ghoshal and Westney, 
1991). Such comparative processes could play an important 
role in decision making in a variety of different industries 
(Daft, Sormunen, and Parks, 1988; Porter, 1998). This raises 
the prospect of second-order imitation through board net- 
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Second-order Imitation 
work ties. While firms may not necessarily imitate the con- 
tent of strategic decisions made by interlock partners in dif- 
ferent industries, they may be influenced by the mimetic 
decision process of tied-to firms. Thus, mimetic scripts may 
be diffused through interlock ties across industries even if 
firms do not directly imitate the strategic content of tied-to 
firms. 
As an example of second-order imitation, consider a scenario 
in which a focal firm, in the most recent time period, spent 4 
percent of sales on R&D and its competitors spent an aver- 
age of 1 percent of sales on R&D, while a tied-to firm in a dif- 
ferent industry spent 4 percent of sales on R&D and its com- 
petitors spent an average of 12 percent. Second-order 
imitation by a focal firm would be evident if, at time t, the 
tied-to firm determines its R&D spending by imitating others 
in its industry such that it increases spending by 8 percent, to 
the level of its competitors, and the focal firm, having learned 
this method for determining R&D spending through its con- 
nection to the tied-to firm, then changes its R&D spending to 
match its own competitors, decreasing R&D spending by 3 
percent. In this case, the outcomes in each of the interlocked 
firms is different because the average R&D spending differs 
between their two industries. In fact, the firms move apart in 
the level of their R&D spending. Nevertheless, the process 
used to determine the outcomes is similar. By contrast, first- 
order imitation would be evident if a particular decision were 
made by the tied-to firm and then echoed by the focal firm, 
e.g., if the tied-to firm increased R&D by 2 percent, perfect 
first-order imitation by the focal firm would lead to an 
increase of R&D by 2 percent. 
Given that intraindustry imitation is manifested by greater or 
lower strategic similarity between the focal firm and other 
firms in its industry, after controlling for common industry- 
level factors, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis la (Hia): Greater similarity in business strategy 
between tied-to firms and other firms in their industries will lead to 
greater similarity in business strategy between the focal firm and 
other firms in its industry. 
Acquisitions. Research on acquisition waves suggests that 
firms may be influenced by the acquisition activity of com- 
petitors (Browne and Rosengren, 1988; Kopp, 1990). The use 
of a mimetic decision process in this context is analogous to 
the use of mimetic processes in determining business strate- 
gy, although certain elements are unique to each context: 
firms sometimes collect information on the acquisition activi- 
ty of competitors from archival sources such as the M&A 
Database and reference these data in deciding whether to 
modify the firm's policy toward acquisitions (Kopp, 1990; 
Phan, 2000). Although the occurrence of such mimetic 
behavior is well-established empirically, theoretical explana- 
tions for the imitation of competitors' acquisition activity are 
not well developed. Haunschild (1993) invoked social learning 
theory in proposing that the level or amount of acquisition 
activity at tied-to firms provides a concrete model that 
encourages imitation by the focal firm. Our theory, in con- 
trast, suggests that social learning through board ties is more 
7231ASQ, December 2001 
This content downloaded from 128.83.205.78 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 20:32:40 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
pronounced for decision-making processes than for policy 
content. Thus, social learning through interlock ties may be 
especially likely to facilitate second-order imitation of acquisi- 
tion activity, wherein ties to firms that imitate the acquisition 
activity of their competitors prompt similar mimetic process- 
es at the focal firm. As in the case of business strategy, 
intraindustry imitation is likely to be manifested by greater or 
lower similarity between the focal firm and other firms in its 
industry with respect to acquisition activity, after controlling 
for common industry-level factors: 
Hypothesis lb (Hib): Greater similarity in acquisition activity 
between tied-to firms and other firms in their industries will lead to 
greater similarity in acquisition activity between the focal firm and 
other firms in its industry. 
Executive compensation. A central aspect of executive 
compensation policy concerns the use of performance-con- 
tingent compensation (Seward and Walsh, 1996; Finkelstein 
and Boyd, 1998). Various forms of long-term incentive com- 
pensation, such as stock options and performance shares, 
are used to align executive compensation with shareholder 
performance. Empirical studies have found considerable vari- 
ance in the extent to which boards design compensation poli- 
cies that link executive pay to firm performance, and 
researchers in the organizational literature have begun to 
explore how social processes might predict whether firms 
design such policies (cf. Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) suggested that social com- 
parison processes may lead boards to consider the compen- 
sation policies of other firms in their industries in developing 
a policy for the focal firm. This proposition is consistent with 
qualitative and descriptive research on boards, which indi- 
cates that firms sometimes collect data from archival sources 
such as Compact Disclosure or surveys on executive com- 
pensation polices at other firms to inform their own policies, 
such as the level of performance-contingent compensation 
for top executives (Crystal, 1991). 
Recent research by Westphal and Zajac (1997), however, pro- 
vides little evidence that firms consistently imitate the com- 
pensation policies of their interlock partners. They found that 
board interlock ties to companies in other industries that had 
recently increased their use of performance-contingent exec- 
utive compensation did not necessarily lead to similar change 
at the focal firm. The theoretical perspective developed in 
this study suggests that network ties may influence compen- 
sation policy more strongly when imitation is conceived as a 
second-order process: while firms may not necessarily imi- 
tate the level of performance-contingent compensation of 
their interlock partners, they may still adopt the mimetic 
processes used in determining compensation policies. Thus, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis lc (Hlc): Greater compensation similarity between tied- 
to firms and other firms in their industries will lead to greater com- 
pensation similarity between the focal firm and other firms in its 
industry. 
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Second-order Imitation 
Application of Mimetic Processes to Different Policy 
Decisions 
The potential for second-order imitation raises the possibility 
that network effects could extend across individual policy 
decisions. To the extent that the comparative practices that 
underlie imitation can be adapted to various policy domains 
(Daft, Sormunen, and Parks, 1988), the imitation of such 
practices may influence multiple different policy outcomes. 
Our theoretical perspective suggests that if a firm is tied to 
other firms that compare their policies on a particular dimen- 
sion against those of competitors, directors of the focal firm 
are more likely to accept such comparisons as a normatively 
appropriate component of the decision-making process. As 
discussed above, because such decision-making rules or 
scripts are more likely than decision outcomes to become 
taken for granted, or accepted on a preconscious level, such 
experience may lead directors to enact mimetic scripts in 
other policy arenas reflexively. 
The adoption of an underlying mimetic script, resulting from a 
director's experience with imitation on other boards, can be 
viewed as a meta-construct that gives rise to mimetic 
processes in different policy domains at the focal firm. This 
perspective is consistent with the notion of a meta-script or 
abstract script invoked in social psychology and micro-sociol- 
ogy (Goffman, 1967; Nisbett and Ross, 1980: 34; Fletcher, 
Simpson, and Thomas, 2000). From this perspective, individu- 
als learn abstract scripts that can be adapted to particular 
contexts, or instantiated in more specific forms in those con- 
texts. Nisbett and Ross gave the example of general assump- 
tions about appropriate customer service as an abstract script 
that is instantiated as more concrete scripts in different con- 
texts (e.g., fast food restaurants, fine restaurants, airplanes, 
etc.). With respect to board decision processes, an abstract 
mimetic script, learned from a director's experience with imi- 
tation on other boards, can be instantiated as more concrete 
mimetic processes in different policy domains at the focal 
firm, resulting in greater similarity between the focal firm and 
competitors on multiple policy dimensions. Recent studies 
using second-order factor analysis suggest that such underly- 
ing, abstract scripts can be conceived as meta-constructs 
that give rise to more concrete scripts as first-order con- 
structs (Feldt et al., 2000; Fletcher, Simpson, and Thomas, 
2000). Concrete scripts are "quasi-independent" constructs 
that are "partially subsumed" by a more general or abstract 
script (Fletcher, Simpson, and Thomas, 2000: 343). In this 
case, the concrete mimetic scripts are partially subsumed by 
a common, abstract script that includes a general sequence 
of events (e.g., obtain information on policies at competitor 
firms, compare those policies with the focal firm's policies, 
and plan changes to ensure that practices are in line with 
other firms in the industry), but they are also quasi-indepen- 
dent because specific features of the scripts are adapted to 
the particular policy context (e.g., the source of information 
on competitor practices). This leads to our final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Greater similarity on a particular policy dimen- 
sion between tied-to firms and other firms in their industries will 
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lead to greater similarity on different policy dimensions between the 
focal firm and other firms in its industry. 
METHOD 
Our primary methodology involves longitudinal analyses of 
imitation using archival measures. In addition, we conducted 
supplementary analyses of imitation using original survey 
data from CEOs and outside directors to provide a more 
proximate test of the behavioral processes that underlie the 
hypothesized effects. 
Hypothesis Tests Using Longitudinal Archival Data 
Sample and data collection. Our sample was drawn from all 
firms listed in the 1989 Forbes and Fortune 500 indexes. 
Firms were dropped from the sample if complete data on 
business strategy, acquisition activity, and executive compen- 
sation were not available throughout the time period. The 
final sample included 433 companies. We conducted 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests to determine whether 
firms in the initial sample were significantly different from 
firms in the final sample with respect to size and profitability. 
Firms in our sample were not significantly different in size 
(total sales or assets), profitability (return on assets or return 
on equity), or annual stock returns from firms in the larger 
sample frame (p-values range from .43 to .89). Moreover, 
sample firms come from 31 different industries (measured by 
two-digit SIC code) that are representative of all industries in 
the population of Forbes and Fortune 500 firms with respect 
to major attributes of industry structure, including concentra- 
tion and industry constraint (Burt, 1983). 
We collected sufficient data to analyze similarity in business 
strategy, acquisition activity, and compensation policy over a 
five-year period, 1990-1994. To lag our dependent variables 
appropriately, while also measuring prior levels of the similari- 
ty variables (discussed further below), we collected data for 
the years 1986 to 1995. Data on business strategy and finan- 
cial characteristics came from COMPUSTAT. We collected 
executive compensation data from proxy statements and 
information on board characteristics and interlock ties from 
both proxies and Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, 
Directors, and Executives. Acquisition data came from COM- 
PUSTAT and the Securities Data Corporation. 
Measures. We followed several prior studies in measuring 
business strategy according to key resource allocations 
across the primary functional areas of the firm (e.g., Finkel- 
stein and Hambrick, 1990; Thomas, Litschert, and 
Ramaswamy, 1991; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). The 
following strategic dimensions are included (cf. Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1990): advertising intensity (advertising 
expense/sales), plant and equipment newness (net plant and 
equipment/gross plant and equipment), research and devel- 
opment intensity (R&D expense/sales), overhead efficiency 
(selling, general, and administrative xpense/sales), and finan- 
cial leverage (total debt/equity). The first three dimensions 
capture marketing, technology, and capacity expansion activi- 
ties, while overhead efficiency reflects the cost structure of 
the firm, and the firm's capital management is indicated by 
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financial leverage. This set of strategic dimensions effectively 
captures the "competitive profile" of the firm (Geletkanycz 
and Hambrick, 1997: 667). As several authors have noted, 
this measurement approach is based on Mintzberg's (1978) 
conception of strategy as a pattern of actions (e.g., Finkel- 
stein and Hambrick, 1990; Thomas, Litschert, and 
Ramaswamy, 1991; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997). A 
viable alternative approach to measuring business strategy 
classifies firms into discrete configurations of resource 
deployments (e.g., Porter, 1998). Although this approach has 
some face validity, our continuous measure captures grada- 
tions in strategic change that range along a continuum from 
relatively modest adjustments in spending levels to relatively 
large changes in resource allocation. 
We operationalized similarity in business strategy (business 
strategy similarity) using the following Euclidean distance 
measure, which has been used in prior studies to measure 
similarity at both the individual and firm levels (Westphal and 
Zajac, 1997): 
5 N=1 
ssit = (normI Sidt -Sjdt) 
d=1 j=1 
where SSt is the strategic similarity of firm i to the other 
N - 1 firms in its primary industry in period t and Sdt is a spe- 
cific strategic dimension d of firm i in period t. Industry is 
measured at the two-digit SIC code level, given evidence that 
when firms make performance comparisons (e.g., for the 
purpose of determining executive salaries), they compare 
themselves against other firms in the same two-digit SIC 
code (Antle and Smith, 1985; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990). 
This measure adjusts for the number of competitors and dif- 
ferences in metrics across individual strategy dimensions in 
developing an overall similarity score. We conducted two 
separate analyses to ensure that our results were not contin- 
gent on primary SIC code classifications. In the first analysis, 
we measured similarity for each industry in which the firm 
was present (i.e., including secondary SIC codes) and then 
developed a weighted measure according to the firm's rela- 
tive sales in each industry. In the second analysis, we exclud- 
ed conglomerates, for which the primary SIC code classifica- 
tion may be less meaningful (conglomerates were defined as 
firms that make less than 75 percent of their sales from one 
industry). In each case, the results presented below were 
substantively unchanged. We conducted a confirmatory fac- 
tor analysis to examine whether the individual business- 
strategy-similarity variables loaded on a single, underlying 
construct. All variables loaded on one construct as expected, 
with loadings of .5 or greater. Reliability of the measure was 
also acceptably high (alpha = .81). 
In the primary analyses, we analyzed similarity using change 
scores. Change in strategic similarity (SC) was measured for 
the focal firm as strategic similarity at time t+2 (SS t+2) minus 
strategic similarity in the current year (SS). This value was 
subtracted from the highest value in the sample, so that 
higher values indicate greater increases in similarity (Finkel- 
stein and Hambrick, 1990). We then developed an analogous 
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measure for each tied-to firm, lagged by one year, and com- 
puted the average value. Several prior studies have mea- 
sured strategic change over two- or three-year time periods 
(e.g., Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Haveman, 1993; Boeker, 
1997; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Greve, 1998). Large 
firms can make significant changes in their internal resource 
allocation within two years. Although some have argued that 
firms should make significant strategic changes gradually, 
allowing the organization time to adjust (cf. Quinn, 1980), 
several scholars in the strategy literature have noted that 
firms rarely do so, tending instead to make major strategic 
changes in relatively concentrated periods of time (Quinn, 
1980; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Abrahamson, 2000). 
Two potential problems with change scores are low reliability 
and biased coefficients that result from correlations between 
the independent variables and the initial state of the depen- 
dent variable (i.e., y1 in the change score Y2 - Y1) (Allison, 
1990; Edwards, 1995). As noted above, however, the alpha 
for our measure of change in business strategy is acceptably 
high. Moreover, correlations between the independent vari- 
ables and the initial state of the change variables (i.e., similar- 
ity to competitors in the prior period) are consistently non- 
significant (at alpha = .05). Under these circumstances, the 
use of change scores is not inferior to the regressor variable 
method (i.e., regressing Y2 on y1 and the independent vari- 
ables). In fact, the change variable method may be superior 
under these conditions. When the distribution of the depen- 
dent variable is stable from t1 to t2 and does not covary with 
the independent variables, results using change scores can 
be less biased than results from the regressor variable 
method (Kenny, 1975; Kenny and Cohen, 1979; Allison, 
1990). Our data satisfy these conditions. In any event, sepa- 
rate analyses confirmed that results for our hypotheses are 
nearly identical using either approach. We report the results 
of analyses using change scores below. The set of tied-to 
firms includes all companies at which a director from the 
focal firm had a board appointment. We included the board 
ties of both inside and outside directors. We did not include 
indirect ties (i.e., ties between two firms resulting from a 
common tie to a third party) because our theory suggests 
that it is direct participation in decision-making processes on 
other boards that will influence social modeling processes. 
Nevertheless, we conducted separate analyses including indi- 
rect ties and discuss these further below. 
Similarity in acquisition activity. Two major dimensions of 
acquisition activity have been examined in the literature: the 
level of such activity, typically indicated by the number of 
acquisitions over a period of time, and the kind of acquisition 
(i.e., related or diversified) (Haunschild, 1993; Brush, 1996; 
Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). Firms can be influenced by the 
acquisition activity of competitors on both dimensions. As 
noted above, we followed prior research in measuring the 
level of acquisition activity as the number of acquisitions over 
a two-year period (Haunschild, 1993; Brush, 1996). An acqui- 
sition was classified as related when the two-digit SIC code 
of the acquiring firm matched that of the acquired firm; an 
acquisition was classified as diversified when these codes 
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did not match (Haunschild, 1993; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). 
Each type of acquisition indicates a particular conception of 
corporate strategy. Related acquisitions have the strategic 
purpose of leveraging and extending the firm's existing capa- 
bilities, while diversifying acquisitions reduce product-market 
risk (Hopkins, 1987; Brush, 1996; Kochhar and Hitt, 1998). 
The strategic importance of related acquisitions is suggested 
by the resource-based view of strategy, which, as espoused 
by Barney (1991) and Dierickx and Cool (1989), suggests that 
because rent-generating resources are non-fungible, they 
cannot be easily applied to different market settings. An 
important implication of this perspective is that diversified 
acquisitions should tend to be less profitable than related 
acquisitions, and recent evidence generally supports this per- 
spective (Anand and Singh, 1997). We conducted separate 
analyses for each type of acquisition, using similarity mea- 
sures that directly parallel our measures of business strategy 
similarity (acquisition activity similarity). 
Compensation similarity. As discussed above, the relative 
use of performance-contingent compensation is a central 
aspect of executive compensation policy (Seward and Walsh, 
1996; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). The use of performance- 
contingent compensation was measured for each year as the 
total value of long-term incentive grants to the CEO divided 
by the CEO's total direct compensation (Westphal and Zajac, 
1997; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Long-term incentive 
grants include stock options, restricted stock, and so-called 
performance incentives (granted in shares, units or cash). We 
used the Black-Scholes method to estimate the value of 
stock options. Other stock-based grants were valued using 
the market price on the date of grant (see Crystal, 1984; 
Westphal and Zajac, 1997). We then developed measures of 
compensation similarity that directly parallel measures of 
strategy similarity described above. 
Control variables. To account for industry-specific trends of 
standardization or specialization, we measured change in sim- 
ilarity at the industry level by calculating the coefficient-of 
variation among firms in the industry (excluding the focal 
firm) in each year (Allison, 1978) and then created industry 
change variables to parallel the independent variables dis- 
cussed above. We also controlled for change in similarity at 
tied-to industries, averaged across the industries of tied-to 
firms, to control for any possible confounding effects of simi- 
larities between the focal firm's industry and tied-to firms' 
industries that might prompt imitation by both the focal firm 
and tied-to firms. Moreover, given that mimetic processes 
may tend to become routinized over time (Levitt and March, 
1988; Ocasio, 1999), we controlled for prior change in busi- 
ness strategy similarity, similarity in acquisition activity, and 
compensation similarity at the focal firm over the prior three- 
year period. The hypothesized effects were unchanged when 
this variable was measured over shorter or longer periods of 
time (e.g., two or four years). These controls minimize left 
truncation in our analyses, as recommended by Carroll and 
Hannan (2000: 149-150). 
Neo-institutional perspectives would suggest that relatively 
high levels of environmental uncertainty could lead to greater 
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use of imitation in the decision-making process (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Haunschild and Miner, 1997). Thus, we 
included a control variable to capture environmental uncer- 
tainty. We used the measure developed by Wiersema and 
Bantel (1993), which gauges uncertainty according to 
changes in the industry concentration ratio (i.e., the percent- 
age of an industry's sales, at the two-digit SIC level, account- 
ed for by the four largest firms). The concentration ratio is a 
primary determinant of competitive dynamics in an industry, 
and large absolute changes in this variable indicate a high 
level of environmental uncertainty (Wiersema and Bantel, 
1993; Porter, 1998). 
Some research has provided evidence that central firms may 
be more susceptible to institutional processes such as 
mimetic isomorphism (Gartrell, 1987). Because board central- 
ity might therefore be associated with the level of imitation, 
we controlled for board centrality in the network of interlock- 
ing directorates, measured as the natural log of the total 
number of nonduplicated ties between the focal board and all 
other boards in the larger sample (Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 
1993). 
We also controlled for several governance variables that have 
been hypothesized in prior studies to influence the level of 
board involvement in decision making. The first two capture 
key aspects of board structure and composition: the portion 
of the board composed of outside directors appointed after 
the CEO (Wade, O'Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990) and board 
leadership structure, coded as 1 if the CEO and board chair 
positions are separate in a particular year (Mallette and 
Fowler, 1992). These variables are thought to indicate the 
level of board independence from management. Independent 
directors might be considered more likely to imitate the poli- 
cies of competitors in determining the focal firm's policies 
because, according to some governance researchers (e.g., 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989), outside directors have less firm- 
specific knowledge than inside directors and are therefore 
less able to develop policies that exploit the firm's unique 
assets or market position. In addition, we controlled for the 
level of ownership by institutional investors. Although empiri- 
cal evidence is mixed, some authors have suggested that 
powerful institutional investors may pressure independent 
directors to exert influence over strategic decision making 
(Useem, 1993). We measured institutional ownership as the 
number of shares held by pension funds, banks and trust 
companies, savings and loans, mutual fund managers, and 
labor union funds divided by total common stock (Hill and 
Hansen, 1991). 
Given that firm size has been shown to predict mimetic ten- 
dencies (Fligstein, 1991; Deephouse, 1999), we controlled for 
size in all models, measured as the log of sales. Because 
poor performance could lead firms to change their decision- 
making processes, including their propensity to imitate com- 
petitors in determining strategy or compensation policies 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984), we 
included two measures of firm performance in all models: 
return on assets and market-to-book value of equity. In sepa- 
rate analyses, we operationalized performance relative to his- 
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torical levels (i.e., the average over the prior three years) and 
performance relative to other firms in the same industry 
(averaged across firms in the industry) using spline functions 
(see Greve, 1998), and the hypothesized results were 
unchanged. Given that acquisition activity may be constrained 
by debt-service requirements, we also controlled for the 
debt-to-assets ratio in analyses of acquisition activity. Finally, 
we controlled for time-specific determinants of imitation by 
including year dummy variables in all models. 
Although it might be supposed that firms would be more like- 
ly to imitate competitors in relatively concentrated industries, 
industry concentration is not correlated with our independent 
variables, and separate analyses confirmed that the hypothe- 
sized effects were unchanged when concentration was 
included in the models. Separate analyses also showed that a 
focal firm's diversification was not correlated with our inde- 
pendent variables and had no effect on imitation of compen- 
sation or acquisition activity (diversification was marginally 
related to imitation of business strategy). Industry concentra- 
tion and diversification generally had a stronger effect on imi- 
tation when control variables for prior imitation were omitted, 
suggesting that the effect of the former variables, which are 
relatively stable over time, are reflected in prior imitation by 
the focal firm. 
While we focus on board interlock ties in this study, a variety 
of other social network ties could influence acquisition activi- 
ty. In a recent study, Palmer and Barber (2001) found that 
certain social ties held by CEOs, such as membership in an 
exclusive social club, had strong effects on the likelihood of 
completing a diversified acquisition. While membership in 
elite social clubs may provide information and influence that 
facilitates acquisition activity (Palmer and Barber, 2001), we 
did not control for such network variables in our analysis 
because it seems less likely that such ties would spread 
information about underlying mimetic processes. It is also 
not clear why a CEO's social influence, as indicated by mem- 
bership in an elite social club, would affect an organization's 
mimetic propensity. 
We also did not control for the length of a director's tenure. It 
might be supposed that the effect of director ties to another 
firm on practices at the focal firm would depend on the 
length of a director's tenure at the other company, to the 
extent that directors learn decision-making processes better 
over time. Given that directors typically participate in monthly 
board meetings and often monthly or bimonthly committee 
meetings, however, they can be expected to learn decision- 
making processes relatively quickly. Moreover, the average 
tenure of directors in our sample is relatively long (approxi- 
mately seven years, with a standard deviation of about five 
years). Thus, it seems unlikely that director tenure would 
explain much variance in the extent of social learning of deci- 
sion-making processes. 
Analysis. Given the potential for autocorrelation in our 
pooled cross-sectional dataset, we used generalized least 
squares (GLS), random-effects models to predict movement 
of business strategy similarity, acquisition similarity, and com- 
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pensation similarity. These models are based on the follow- 
ing equations: 
Yi = at + xP + v, + F-, (1) 
(YYt , Yi) = (Xit-xI)I3 + (-t -?) (2) 
where v, is the unit-specific residual and Ait is the standard 
residual. The fixed-effects or within estimator essentially 
uses ordinary least squares to estimate equation 2, the 
between estimator uses OLS to estimate equation 1, and the 
random-effects estimator is a (matrix) weighted average of 
the estimates produced by the between and fixed-effects 
estimators. The random-effects estimator, unlike the fixed- 
effects estimator, assumes that v, is not correlated with x, in 
equation 1 above. To determine whether our use of the ran- 
dom-effects estimator is appropriate, we conducted the 
Hausman specification test (Greene, 1993). This tests 
whether coefficients estimated by the fixed-effects estimator 
and those estimated by the random-effects estimator are sig- 
nificantly different. The null hypothesis is that there is no sys- 
tematic difference in coefficients generated by the two esti- 
mators. In this case the x2 was not significant (at a = .10), 
suggesting that our models are correctly specified and that v, 
is not correlated with xi. 
Using lagged versions of dependent variables as control vari- 
ables in the models (i.e., prior change in similarity) as we did 
can create additional serial correlation that is not addressed 
by the random-effects estimator. To adjust for this, we speci- 
fied the lagged dependent variables as instruments (Greene, 
1993). In addition, to correct for heteroskedasticity resulting 
from industry differences, we used the Newey-West robust 
variance estimator for clustered data (Newey and West, 
1987; Rogers, 1993). This procedure generates robust esti- 
mates when observations are not independent within clus- 
ters or groups. In this case, observations involving firms in 
the same industry may not be independent. The robust vari- 
ance estimator allows us to correct for such biases. It essen- 
tially treats each cluster (i.e., firms in the same industry) as a 
"super-observation" that contributes to the variance esti- 
mate. 
We measured similarity over five time periods, yielding a 
total of 2,165 organizational spells. The measure assesses 
movement by the focal firm toward other firms in the indus- 
try, net of movement by other firms, to isolate the effects of 
actions taken by the focal firm. In other words, if all of the 
other firms in the industry moved closer to the focal firm, 
without the focal firm changing its strategic posture, the 
dependent variable would be zero. In separate analyses, we 
tested the hypotheses using two-stage least squares regres- 
sion models (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997), which estimate 
similarity on a particular policy dimension y1 by first generat- 
ing reduced-form estimates of similarity on each of the other 
two dimensions, Y2 and y3, and then including predicted val- 
ues from those equations as instruments in a second-stage 
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equation estimating similarity on y1. The results were sub- 
stantively unchanged from the results presented below. This 
indicates that any observed relationship between similarity at 
tied-to firms on a particular policy dimension Y2 and similarity 
at the focal firm on a different dimension y1 is not an artifact 
of concurrent changes in Y2 at the focal firm. 
Hypothesis Tests Using a Combination of Survey and 
Archival Data 
To provide an additional test of our theoretical perspective 
that complements our longitudinal, archival methodology, we 
included questions about mimetic practices in a large sample 
survey of CEOs and outside directors at firms in our sample 
frame. The survey was sent to CEOs of 600 firms listed in 
the 1998 Forbes/Fortune 500 listings. Two hundred and fifty- 
seven CEOs responded, and complete archival data were 
available for 241 of those cases (40 percent of the initial sam- 
ple frame). Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests showed 
that respondents were not significantly different from non- 
respondents with respect to business strategy similarity, 
compensation similarity, performance, size, or board centrali- 
ty (N = 562). 
The survey items were designed to assess the extent to 
which firms have adopted a mimetic script (i.e., a sequence 
of steps that can lead to similarity to competitors) in different 
policy domains, thus permitting a relatively direct test of the 
decision-making processes that underlie second-order imita- 
tion. One survey measure assessed the use of a mimetic 
decision process in determining business strategy. For 
instance, one item asked respondents to assess to what 
extent the firm's strategic decision-making process involved 
the following actions to determine the level of spending on 
R&D: acquiring data on how much competitors spend on 
R&D; comparing the spending of competitors with spending 
at the focal firm; and using this analysis, planning changes in 
spending levels to ensure that practices are in line with other 
firms in the industry. Five additional items asked about the 
use of mimetic processes in determining other dimensions of 
business strategy, and an analogous set of questions gauged 
the use of imitation in making decisions about CEO compen- 
sation and acquisitions. Factor analysis showed that these 
items loaded on three different factors, as expected, with 
acceptably high reliability for each scale (alpha = .86 for the 
business strategy scale, .87 for the acquisition activity scale, 
and .91 for the compensation scale). Analogous survey 
scales were included in a second questionnaire sent to all 
outside directors at firms whose CEOs had responded to the 
initial survey. For the sample of firms with a responding CEO 
and at least one responding director (N = 196), there was 
strong evidence for interrater reliability of the survey mea- 
sures (kappa coefficients exceeded .75 for all scale items but 
one). These items were based on 5-point Likert-type 
response formats. 
We used LISREL (Joreskog and Sorbum, 1993) to examine 
whether these perceptual measures of mimetic processes 
mediated the effects of interlock ties on change in business 
strategic similarity, compensation similarity, and similarity in 
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acquisition activity at the focal firm. The exogenous constructs 
were measured in the prior year (t-1), and the ultimate endoge- 
nous constructs (change in similarity at the focal firm) were 
measured in the year subsequent to the survey (t+1). A prima- 
ry advantage of structural equation modeling is that it permits 
a stronger test of validity by estimating the direct structural 
relation between a latent variable and its purported indicator, 
allowing relationships between that indicator and other indica- 
tors and constructs to vary (Bollen, 1989). We used a two- 
stage approach to model fitting and assessment in which mea- 
surement properties of the model are assessed prior to 
considering structural relationships between constructs. 
RESULTS 
Results of Hypothesis Tests Using Longitudinal Archival 
Data 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
variables used in our analyses. Table 2 presents results of GLS 
models predicting change in business strategy similarity, simi- 
larity in acquisition activity, and compensation similarity at the 
focal firm. H1a suggested that change in business strategy 
similarity would be positively influenced by imitation of busi- 
ness strategy at tied-to firms. This hypothesis is supported in 
model 1, which shows that change in the business strategy 
similarity of tied-to firms had a significant positive effect on 
change in such similarity at the focal firm. Similarly, model 1 
indicated support for H2: change in similarity in acquisition 
activity and compensation similarity at tied-to firms also had a 
significant positive effect on change in business strategy simi- 
larity at the focal firm. 
In model 2 of table 2 results are presented for diversified 
acquisition activity, and very similar results were obtained for 
related acquisition activity. The results support H1 b: change in 
acquisition activity similarity of tied-to firms has a significant, 
positive effect on change in such similarity at the focal firm. H2 
is further supported in this model. Change in similarity of tied- 
to firms on the other two policy dimensions, business strategy 
and compensation, has a significant and positive effect on 
change in acquisition activity similarity at the focal firm. 
Model 3 of table 2 presents results of a GLS model predicting 
change in compensation similarity at the focal firm. In general, 
results in these analyses mirrored those in models 1 and 2. 
Change in compensation similarity at tied-to firms had a signifi- 
cant and positive effect on change in compensation similarity 
at the focal firm, supporting H1c. H2 was partially supported. 
Change in business strategy similarity at tied-to firms had a 
significant, positive effect on change in compensation similarity 
at the focal firm, but change in acquisition activity similarity at 
tied-to firms was not significantly related to change in compen- 
sation similarity at the focal firm. Overall, the results provide 
strong evidence in support of hypothesis 2, which predicted 
cross-policy imitation through board ties: imitation of competi- 
tors on a particular policy dimension by tied-to firms increased 
imitation by the focal firm on a different policy dimension in all 
cases but one (i.e., the effect of imitation of acquisition activity 
by tied-to firms on imitation of compensation by the focal firm). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Change in business strat. similarity of tied-to firms 0.01 1.01 
2. Change in comp. similarity of tied-to firms 0.05 0.16 .08 
3. Change in acquisition activity similarity of tied-to firms 0.05 1.14 .14 .10 
4. Prior change in business strat. similarity of focal firm 0.02 0.62 .06 .04 .03 
5. Prior change in comp. similarity of focal firm 0.06 0.02 .03 .09 .01 .12 
6. Prior change in acquisition activity sim. of focal firm 0.04 0.68 .04 .03 .04 .15 .09 
7. Variance in business strat. similarity of tied-to firms 0.82 0.34 .02 .03 .02 .01 -.01 
8. Variance in comp. similarity of tied-to firms 0.12 0.06 -.01 .02 .01 .02 .01 
9. Variance in acquisition activity sim. of tied-to firms 0.72 0.29 -.01 -.02 .04 .00 .00 
10. Return on assets 5.05 7.06 .01 -.01 .05 .01 -.02 
11. Market-to-book value 1.73 1.66 .02 -.01 .01 .03 .00 
12. Log of sales 8.11 1.17 -.02 .00 .01 -.02 -.03 
13. Environmental uncertainty, focal firm 0.02 0.03 -.01 .01 -.02 .05 .02 
14. Board centrality 1.79 0.95 .02 .05 .02 .02 .04 
15. Directors appointed after the CEO 0.31 0.26 .00 -.01 -.01 -.02 .02 
16. CEO/board chair separation 0.77 0.42 .03 .01 .00 .02 -.02 
17. Institutional ownership 0.34 0.20 .01 .01 .02 .05 -.01 
18. Change in business strat. similarity, focal industry -0.03 0.10 .02 .01 -.01 .02 .01 
19. Change in business strat. similarity, tied-to industries -0.02 0.04 .03 .04 .05 .00 -.02 
20. Change in comp. similarity, focal industry 0.03 0.03 .01 .01 .00 .04 .03 
21. Change in comp. similarity, tied-to industries 0.01 0.02 .03 .06 .02 -.01 .00 
22. Change in acq. activity similarity, focal industry -0.01 0.09 -.01 -.02 .01 .04 .02 
23. Change in acq. activity similarity, tied-to industries 0.00 0.04 .04 .02 .06 -.01 .01 
24. Change in business strat. similarity 0.02 1.92 .35 .24 .20 .12 .22 
25. Change in comp. similarity 0.03 0.31 .21 .28 .14 .18 .09 
26. Change in acquisition activity similarity 0.05 1.76 .20 .15 .23 .19 .06 
Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
7. Variance in business strat. similarity of tied-to firms .01 
8. Variance in comp. similarity of tied-to firms .00 .06 
9. Variance in acquisition activity sim. of tied-to firms .01 .08 .05 
10. Return on assets .09 .02 .00 .03 
11. Market-to-book value .12 .01 .01 -.02 .17 
12. Log of sales .13 -.03 .00 .01 -.05 -.04 
13. Environmental uncertainty, focal firm .03 .01 .02 .03 -.06 -.03 -.07 
14. Board centrality -.02 -.02 -.03 .02 .03 -.01 .03 .00 
15. Directors appointed after the CEO -.01 .02 -.01 .02 .08 .02 .13 .11 .02 
16. CEO/board chair separation .04 -.01 .00 .04 .06 .03 .10 .09 -.03 -.21 
17. Institutional ownership .10 -.03 .04 .01 .12 .05 .14 .02 .02 .05 
18. Change in business strat. similarity, focal industry .03 .02 .04 -.01 -.02 .02 -.03 .05 -.01 -.02 
19. Change in business strat. similarity, tied-to industries .01 .00 .05 .04 .01 -.01 .01 .00 -.02 -.03 
20. Change in comp. similarity, focal industry .02 .01 .01 .01 -.04 -.01 -.02 .08 -.02 -.01 
21. Change in comp. similarity, tied-to industries -.01 .00 -.01 .00 .03 .01 -.01 .01 .00 .02 
22. Change in acq. activity similarity, focal industry .06 -.01 .03 .02 .02 .05 -.06 .03 -.03 .01 
23. Change in acq. activity similarity, tied-to industries .02 -.01 .00 .04 .01 -.01 .00 -.01 .01 .04 
24. Change in business strat. similarity .15 .27 .12 .12 -.06 -.32 .28 .13 .07 .04 
25. Change in comp. similarity .19 .15 .27 .12 -.06 -.03 .25 .06 .13 .03 
26. Change in acquisition activity similarity .20 .09 .10 .20 .02 .17 .14 .05 .13 .01 
Variable 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
17. Institutional ownership .03 
18. Change in business strat. similarity, focal industry -.01 .01 
19. Change in business strat. similarity, tied-to industries .00 -.01 .05 
20. Change in comp. similarity, focal industry -.01 .05 .08 .02 
21. Change in comp. similarity, tied-to industries .03 .00 .01 .01 .01 
22. Change in acq. activity similarity, focal industry .07 -.01 .10 -.02 .05 .00 
23. Change in acq. activity similarity, tied-to industries .02 .02 .03 .02 .01 .03 .01 
24. Change in business strat. similarity .21 -.03 .12 .04 .08 .02 .07 .02 
25. Change in comp. similarity .10 .04 .05 .06 .13 .08 .04 .03 .18 
26. Change in acquisition activity similarity .14 .06 .07 .02 .05 -.01 .09 -.01 .25 .21 
Among the control variables, the most consistent predictor of 
imitation is firm size. Larger firms are more likely to imitate 
competitors across all three policy domains, consistent with 
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Table 2 
GLS Regression Analysis (N = 2,165)* 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Business strategy Similarity in Compensation 
Independent variable similarity acquisition activity similarity 
1. Change in business strategy similarity of tied-to firms .208 .063" .027 
(.035) (.034) (.01 1) 
2. Change in compensation similarity of tied-to firms .676 .802w .231 
(.226) (.346) (.074) 
3. Change in acquisition activity similarity of tied-to firms .059 .086 .010 
(.024) (.030) (.008) 
4. Return on assets -.008 .003 -.003+ 
(.006) (.006) (.002) 
5. Market-to-book value -.096 .064" -.002 
(.026) (.029) (.008) 
6. Log of sales .094 .1 55" .021 * 
(.028) (.061) (.009) 
7. Environmental uncertainty 1.813w 1.179 .423 
(.761) (1.841) (.250) 
8. Board centrality .043- .101 .01 8" 
(.026) (.069) (.008) 
9. Directors appointed after the CEO .037 -.057 .022 
(.11 0) (.279) (.036) 
1 0. CEO/board chair separation .290 -.268 .035 
(.084) (.180) (.027) 
11. Institutional ownership -.119 .526 .055 
(.157) (.351) (.052) 
12. Debt/assets .297" 
(.116) 
13. Prior change in business strat. similarity of focal firm .078 .125 .033" 
(.045) (.043) (.015) 
14. Prior change in comp. similarity of focal firm 8.702 3.270 1.530 
(3.398) (4.098) (1.077) 
15. Prior change in acquisition activity similarity of focal firm .075- .207 .029" 
(.040) (.102) (.013) 
16. Change in acquisition activity similarity-focal industry .440w .255 .432" 
(.189) (.489) (.207) 
17. Change in acquisition activity similarity-tied-to industry .587 -.213 .744- 
(.457) (.466) (.425) 
18. Year 1 -.016 -.097 .003 
(.073) (.065) (.023) 
19. Year 2 -.102 -.042 -.001 
(.073) (.068) (.024) 
20. Year 3 .034 .013 .017 
(.072) (.067) (.023) 
21. Year 4 .013 .082 -.011 
(.073) (.067) (.023) 
Constant 1.544 9.676 .346 
(2.103) (2.609) (.654) 
Chi-square 343.16 141 .89 124.05 
* p < .10; * p < .05; p < .01; p < .001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized effects. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Model 2 results are for diversified acquisitions. 
past research (Fligstein, 1991; Deephouse, 1999). The 
results also indicate that firms with poor market-to-book 
value are more likely to imitate their competitors with 
respect to business strategy and acquisition activity. Finally, 
there is some evidence that prior imitation by the focal firm 
on a particular policy dimension increases the likelihood of 
subsequent imitation in different policy domains, although 
the evidence is not consistent across models. Imitation of a 
particular policy is not strongly associated with subsequent 
imitation of the same policy: firms may significantly 
increase similarity to competitors in one period and then, 
having adjusted their strategy as desired, make little or no 
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Second-order Imitation 
change in subsequent periods. Overall, the most consistent 
effects in the analyses, aside from firm size, are the hypoth- 
esized effects of change in similarity and variance in similar- 
ity at tied-to firms. The insignificant effects of change in 
similarity at tied-to industries is not inconsistent with our 
hypotheses. Given that this control variable is included in 
the models together with change in similarity at tied-to 
firms, a significant effect would have indicated that changes 
in similarity among firms in other industries that are not tied 
to the focal firm through board interlocks are correlated 
with changes in similarity at the focal firm, which is not 
suggested by our theory. 
As noted above, prior studies have generally not found evi- 
dence for first-order imitation of strategic policies, including 
business strategy and compensation policy, through board 
interlock ties that lead to similar changes at the focal firm 
(Davis, 1994; Fligstein, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 1997; 
Palmer and Barber, 2001). Moreover, we replicated these 
(non) results in separate analyses; in particular, we modeled 
simple change in the level of compensation and business 
strategy variables as a function of prior change in those vari- 
ables at tied-to firms. The results were consistently non-sig- 
nificant, suggesting that companies in this sample did not 
appear to imitate the content of business strategy and com- 
pensation policies of interlock partners in other industries. 
We also assessed first-order imitation of acquisition activity, 
given that Haunschild (1993) did find evidence for the diffu- 
sion of acquisition activity through board interlocks. The 
results of these analyses are provided in table 3. Model 1 
essentially replicates Haunschild's (1 993) primary finding: 
change in the level of acquisition activity by tied-to firms 
predicts change in the level of such activity at the focal 
firm. We then examined first-order imitation together with 
second-order imitation by conducting a two-stage regres- 
sion analysis of acquisition activity (model 2), in which the 
first-stage equation estimates similarity in acquisition activi- 
ty based on similarity at tied-to firms (i.e., the second-order 
imitation model shown in table 3), and parameter estimates 
from this equation are included as an instrumental variable 
in estimating the level of acquisition activity. The second- 
order effect remains significant when the instrumental vari- 
able from the second-order model is included together with 
the first-order variable. The first-order effect becomes non- 
significant, which suggests that what appeared to be first- 
order imitation of acquisition activity (i.e., simple imitation 
of acquisition strategies of tied-to firms) may actually mask 
second-order imitation (i.e., imitation of the propensity for 
tied-to firms to imitate their competitors with respect to 
acquisition activity and other policy outcomes). 
We also conducted separate analyses to explore the possi- 
ble role of indirect ties in second-order imitation. Mizruchi 
(1992) found that indirect ties through financial institutions 
strongly predicted similarity in political behavior between 
firms. He suggested that boards of financial institutions pro- 
vide a forum for the exchange of information, including 
information about political contributions, leading to similar 
political behavior between firms that share board ties to the 
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Table 3 
Supplementary Analyses of Acquisition Activity (N = 2,165)* 
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 
1. Change in acquisition activity at tied-to firms .051 .032 
(.023) (.035) 
2. Instrumental variable from model of acquisition 
similarity .092w 
(.026) 
3. Return on assets .003" .0040 
(.002) (.002) 
4. Market-to-book value .01 1 .01 5*. 
(.004) (.006) 
5. Log of sales .016 .016 
(.010) (.013) 
6. Environmental uncertainty .228 .568 
(.298) (.421) 
7. Board centrality .0200 .033" 
(.012) (.016) 
8. Debt/assets .067 .086w 
(.033) (.041) 
9. Prior change in acquisition activity at focal firm .0260 .0370 
(.015) (.022) 
10. Year 1 -.003 -.037 
(.034) (.043) 
1 1. Year 2 -.014 -.060 
(.034) (.043) 
12. Year 3 -.009 -.019 
(.034) (.043) 
13. Year 4 .031 .036 
(.034) (.043) 
Constant 1.109" .709 
(.093) (.182) 
Chi-square 30.72m 42.02 
* p < .10; " p < .05; p < .01; p < .001; one-tailed tests for hypothesized 
effects. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are presented for diversified 
acquisitions. Model 1 is estimated with Poisson regression, as the dependent 
variable is a moving count of the number of acquisitions in the last two years 
minus the number of acquisitions in the previous two-year period; the model 
includes control variables that were significant in Haunschild's (1993) analysis 
of acquisition activity. Model 2 is estimated with two-stage regression. 
same institutions. As noted above, we did not expect indi- 
rect board ties to have strong effects on second-order imita- 
tion; such ties facilitate diffusion through explicit informa- 
tion sharing among corporate leaders, and while directors 
may discuss individual policy decisions that were made on 
other boards, they seem less likely to discuss tacit decision- 
making processes that occur elsewhere, such as mimetic 
processes. Nevertheless, to ensure that our results were 
not driven by indirect ties, we estimated separate models 
that included control variables for change in similarity of 
tied-to firms based on indirect ties through financial institu- 
tions. Given that institutional investors can also transfer 
strategic information and advice between firms, we also 
included control variables for change in similarity at other 
firms that had the same institutional investors. The results 
were substantively unchanged with these control variables 
included. Importantly, this also indicates that our findings 
are not driven by structural equivalence between the focal 
firm and tied-to firms (Burt, 1987; Mizruchi, 1992). 
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Results of Hypothesis Tests Using Survey and Archival 
Data 
In our tests of the mediating effects of survey measures of 
mimetic process using LISREL, fit indices for the measure- 
ment model showed acceptable model fit: the goodness of 
fit index and normed fit index were .91 and .92, respectively. 
This provides further evidence that survey indicators of 
mimetic decision processes in each of the three policy 
domains-business strategy, acquisition activity, and com- 
pensation policy-loaded on three different factors, as 
expected. Results also showed that a meta-factor model, 
with first-order factor estimates (i.e., mimetic decision 
processes in each of the three policy domains) determined 
by a single meta-factor, fit the data well (goodness of fit 
index and normed fit index greater than .9). By contrast, a 
single-factor model, in which all mimetic process items are 
specified as indicators of a single, underlying construct, did 
not show adequate model fit. This supports our theoretical 
assumption that mimetic processes in each policy domain 
are quasi-independent constructs that are enacted from an 
underlying abstract mimetic script. We did not operationalize 
the meta-construct in the regression models (Bollen, 1989; 
Feldt et al., 2000) because this construct would simply medi- 
ate the relationships between imitation on a particular policy 
dimension at tied-to firms and imitation on each dimension at 
the focal firm. 
Results of the path analyses are displayed in figure 1 (N = 
241). They show that the survey measures of mimetic 
process mediated the effects of change in similarity at tied-to 
firms on subsequent change in similarity at the focal firm for 
all three policy dimensions (the control variables discussed 
above are included in the LISREL model but are not displayed 
Figure 1. LISREL results (t-statistics). 
Change in Business 
Strategy Similarity, ) S. 7 
Tied-to Firms 
Mimetic 727 Subsequen 
Decision Process, ) 267 o Change in Business 
Business Strateg taeySmlrt 
Change in Subsequent 
Acquisition 2.799w McimeioPrces 5.483m" Change in 
ctivity Similarity, Decision Procesn Acquisition 
\ed-to Firms Fit Ac o S ty 
Mimet c Subsequent *V Compensation Compensation 
ange in Similarity 
Compensation 
Similarity, Goodness of Fit Index: .91 
Tied-to Firm Normed Fit Index: .93 
Root Mean Square Residual: .035 
p ? .05; " p ? .01; p < .001; significance levels are one-tailed for hypothesized paths; control paths are not dis- 
played. 
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in the figure). These results provide further support for 
H1a-H1c. Moreover, the results were also generally consis- 
tent with H2: greater similarity on a particular policy dimen- 
sion (x) between tied-to firms and their competitors led to 
greater similarity between the focal firm and its competitors 
on a different policy dimension (y) through the use of a 
mimetic decision process in determining policy y. There was 
one exception to this pattern of results: the use of a mimetic 
decision process in determining compensation did not medi- 
ate the effect of similarity in acquisition activity of tied-to 
firms on similarity in compensation at the focal firm. In fur- 
ther analysis, we used the survey measures to operationalize 
imitation at tied-to firms, as well as imitation at the focal firm. 
Results of this analysis are shown in figure 2. They mirror the 
results of our primary analysis shown in figure 1: the relative 
use of a mimetic decision process in determining a particular 
policy at tied-to firms generally has a positive and significant 
effect on the use of a mimetic process in different policy 
domains at the focal firm, which in turn predicts subsequent 
change in similarity to competitors. This analysis has the limi- 
tation of being purely cross-sectional (i.e., imitation at the 
focal firm and tied-to firms is measured concurrently), but it 
has the advantage of providing a more direct test of the 
effect of mimetic processes at tied-to firms on mimetic 
processes at the focal firm. These results complement find- 
ings of the longitudinal, archival analyses by providing a rela- 
tively direct test of the behavioral processes that underlie the 
hypothesized effects of board interlock ties on imitation 
across different policy domains. Given that the LISREL analy- 
ses and the GLS analyses use data from different time peri- 
ods, the consistent results also show that our findings gener- 
alize to different time periods. 
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Second-order Imitation 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, the findings provide consistent support for our theo- 
retical perspective on second-order imitation through board 
interlock ties. Analyses indicated that individual changes in 
the content of business strategy and compensation policy did 
not appear to spread through interlock ties to firms in other 
industries. Instead, the results supported our view of interor- 
ganizational imitation as a second-order process in which 
firms adopt the underlying propensity for their interlock part- 
ners to imitate other firms, rather than merely imitating the 
content of individual strategic policies. Results of longitudinal, 
archival analyses suggested that increased use of imitation 
on a particular policy dimension among interlock partners 
was associated with greater use of imitation at the focal firm 
on multiple different policy dimensions, including business 
strategy, executive compensation, and acquisition activity. 
Moreover, analyses of large-sample survey data showed that 
these effects were mediated by the perceived use of mimet- 
ic practices in determining business strategy, acquisition 
activity, and compensation policy, providing relatively direct 
evidence for process imitation through board network ties. 
Thus, network effects were uncovered when imitation was 
conceived as a second-order process. 
These findings contribute to the literature on institutional 
processes and interorganizational networks, as well as 
research on strategic decision making. Prior research on 
interlocking directorates has focused on how overlapping 
board memberships can promote mimetic isomorphism in a 
population by facilitating the diffusion of individual policies 
and structures between firms. The findings of this study 
show how the propensity to imitate other firms in determin- 
ing different policies can itself spread through board ties, 
suggesting that mimetic isomorphism can occur at the level 
of underlying decision processes or scripts, and not merely at 
the level of individual policy content. The findings are also 
consistent with research on social learning, which has shown 
that individuals who observe or participate in decision-making 
processes tend to learn the actions that generate decision 
outcomes more deeply than they learn the final outcome 
itself, as behavioral processes are more likely than outcomes 
to be learned and enacted subconsciously (Gioia and Manz, 
1985; Bandura, 1986; Chickering and Gamson, 1987; Mc- 
Keachie, 1994). Accordingly, to the extent that imitation of 
industry competitors is an important aspect of the policy- 
making process, directors who observe or participate in 
mimetic practices on boards of other firms may be more like- 
ly to accept them as normatively appropriate components of 
the decision-making process. Having done so, they are more 
likely to initiate or support imitation at the focal firm. Given 
that direct participation in decision making is particularly likely 
to encourage social learning, board network ties, which allow 
managers to actively participate in the process of formulating 
strategic decisions, may be particularly likely to foster 
process imitation. 
While our hypotheses and results examine the extent to 
which firms imitate industry competitors, our theoretical 
argument does not assume that when firms make compar- 
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isons, they always compare themselves with competitors. 
Rather, our theory suggests that when a focal firm has net- 
work ties to other firms that compare themselves with com- 
petitors, the focal firm is more likely to make such compar- 
isons as well. It might still be supposed that the power of our 
hypotheses to explain decision-making outcomes is reduced 
to the extent that firms compare themselves with firms out- 
side their industries. Porac, Wade, and Pollock (1999) found 
evidence, however, that firms typically compare themselves 
with competitors. Moreover, while we examined the imita- 
tion of competitors in this study, our theoretical arguments 
should generalize to other mimetic processes as well. Porac 
et al. (1995) showed that firms often view larger firms in their 
industry as closer rivals, which would suggest that firms may 
differentiate on the basis of firm size in making comparisons. 
Future research could extend our findings by examining 
whether network ties to firms that refine their mimetic deci- 
sion process to focus on relatively large competitors might 
cause focal firms to make similar refinements to their deci- 
sion process. 
This study contributes to the strategy literature by offering a 
new perspective on how board network ties can influence 
strategic decision making. Past studies provide little evidence 
that board network ties facilitate the imitation of strategic 
policies (Davis, 1994; Fligstein, 1995; Westphal and Zajac, 
1997; Palmer and Barber, 2001). In a recent study, Westphal 
and Fredrickson (2001) found evidence that directors' past 
strategic experiences at their home companies (i.e., firms 
where they serve as full-time managers) can influence subse- 
quent change in corporate strategy at the focal firm immedi- 
ately following a CEO succession event. There is less evi- 
dence, however, for such network effects during an 
incumbent CEO's tenure. Our theoretical perspective and 
supportive findings suggest that board networks can have 
significant effects on strategic decision making by facilitating 
the spread of underlying mimetic decision processes, which 
in turn influence a relatively broad range of strategic policy 
outcomes, including R&D spending, advertising, and other 
elements of business strategy, as well as acquisition activity 
and executive compensation policy. Analyses of our survey 
data suggested that mimetic processes that are spread 
through board ties can be viewed as meta-scripts that are 
instantiated as more concrete scripts in these different 
strategic policy domains. These findings contribute to a grow- 
ing body of research that examines how interorganizational 
networks can influence strategic decision making (Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Gulati, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, 
and Zaheer, 2000). A limitation to our analysis is that our 
measure of business strategy does not directly reflect the 
resource-based perspective on strategy (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989; Barney, 1991). Future studies could examine second- 
order imitation of strategic change using measures of busi- 
ness strategy that gauge more directly the extent to which 
firms seek to build or exploit sustainable resources. 
The findings of this study suggest that greater theoretical and 
empirical attention should be focused on underlying decision- 
making processes in research on social networks, organiza- 
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tional learning, institutional processes, and corporate gover- 
nance. Theory and research in these literatures that address 
second-order phenomena could yield important new insights. 
For instance, existing research on social networks in organi- 
zations has emphasized how formal network connections 
such as cross-functional teams lead to the diffusion of infor- 
mation about specific innovations (Monge and Contractor, 
1997). Future efforts might also examine how such connec- 
tions may lead to the modification of underlying approaches 
to problem solving (e.g., collaborative, participative approach- 
es), which may lead to further innovations. Building on our 
finding that mimetic routines were applied across different 
decision domains, research on innovation might examine 
how problem-solving routines are created at R&D depart- 
ments and then applied across multiple unrelated problems. 
Researchers might also examine how interorganizational net- 
work ties affect other institutional processes that underlie 
multiple policy domains. Network ties to firms that engage in 
symbolic action in a particular policy domain may influence a 
focal firm's general propensity toward symbolic vs. substan- 
tive action, thus leading to similar symbolic actions across dif- 
ferent policy domains. Moreover, studies might investigate 
the potential for second-order effects in other aspects of 
decision making besides imitation, such as the relative for- 
mality of decision-making processes. Just as mimetic tenden- 
cies in decision making may be enhanced by network ties to 
other firms that use imitation, board ties to firms that use a 
relatively informal process in one area of corporate gover- 
nance, such as executive selection (e.g., using referrals from 
trusted friends rather than a search consultant to fill execu- 
tive positions), may lead a focal firm to use a similarly infor- 
mal process in other areas of corporate governance and strat- 
egy, such as screening acquisition candidates, determining 
market rates for executive compensation, and other decision 
processes that can be expected to vary in formality. Thus, 
the notion of second-order imitation could be extended to 
help explain the impact of networks on a broad array of 
strategic and organizational policies. 
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